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The Kosovo question ringing louder than ever in Georgia

By M. Alkhazashvili
Wednesday, February 6
International recognition for the independence of Kosovo is weeks away, and Tbilisi is readying itself for anything.

A large rock is being thrown into the pond, and Georgia will need to ride out some severe ripples. Mid-level Russian politicians are growling increasingly direct threats to reconsider the status of breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia, plus Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester to boot.

Georgia once echoed Western insistences that Kosovo is sui generis, but now nearly finds itself rhetorical bedfellows with Romania and Cyprus. Kosovo independence, Georgian politicians feebly insist, should require Serbian agreement.

Recognition for an independent Kosovo will certainly complicate Georgia’s efforts to regain Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The most immediate fear is Russian recognition for the separatist regimes of Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, which would effectively preclude any peaceful reintegration of the breakaway territories for the foreseeable future.

Russia’s foreign minister, however, says that Moscow never threatened immediately recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Kosovo, and few observers consider them likely to.

This leaves Moscow in a bind, facing a humiliating rejection of its interests and its insistence that recognizing Kosovo without Serbian consent contravenes international law. Russia, with smoldering secessionist conflicts of its own, benefits most from the status quo.

But the status quo is about to take a knocking, handing Russia a defeat on the periphery of a region it considers its rightful backyard, and where it would like to reassert its dominance. If the Kremlin decides it cannot be trampled over so easily, Georgia could easily be involved in ensuing political crises.

And this at a time when Abkhazia and South Ossetia are doubly highlighted. There are elections here, in which territorial integrity is the perennial top political priority, and a NATO summit in April. Few Alliance members are pleased to bring closer a country with two secessionist conflicts, particularly if Russia makes it clear it will not quietly acquiesce one of its key levers in the South Caucasus, the client regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In Serbia meanwhile, a narrow victory by EU-oriented Boris Tadic in the presidential elections may bode well for Belgrade’s handling of the impending Kosovo declaration, but Tadic faces significant near-term political challenges at homes.

The uncertainty in Belgrade and the impenetrableness of the Kremlin combine for very unpredictable consequences in Georgia.