Georgian-Russian relations offer little to look forward to
By M. Alkhazashvili
(Translated by Diana Dundua)
Wednesday, March 26
Georgian–Russian relations have teetered along a complicated and confrontational route in the post-Soviet period.
Tbilisi has strived for normal interstate relations with the northern neighbor, but Russia persists in viewing Georgia as its vassal state. While partial restoration of transport links may suggest a thaw in relations, Russia’s current stance displays little toleration for an independent and sovereign Georgia.
Moscow’s reactions to the recognition of an independent Kosovo show that Russia does not want to normalize relations with Georgia.
Looking through the post-Soviet period, it can be seen that Georgian-Russian relations developed in a dramatic fashion. This was due to Russia’s acute reaction to Georgia’s wish for independence.
During Mikheil Gorbachev’s perestroika, Georgian officials wanted to initiate negotiations on restoring the nation’s independence: Georgia’s task was to get Russia to acknowledge the occupation and annexation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia of 1918–1921. This would lead to renewed independence.
Moscow didn’t take up the suggestion.
On March 31 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s first president, held a referendum to support the declaration of Georgia’s independence on April 9. This was followed by punitive measures from Russia, including support for separatists and the eventual collapse of Gamsakhurdia’s government.
With the dust still swirling, Gamsakhurdia’s successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was forced to make serious concessions. He brought Georgia into the CIS and signed an agreement which would, in essence, keep Georgia under Russian influence in exchange for Moscow’s cooperation in returning breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia to state control. Russia did not hold up its end of the bargain.
Georgia has no further reason to believe that Moscow will help in conflict resolution.
As Georgia enjoyed increase interest from the West over regional energy projects, Shevardnadze attempted to balance relations between Moscow and the West.
But if Shevardnadze was once cautious about looking to the West for security and aid, by the end of his tenure as president he was asking NATO to take in Georgia as a member.
The post-Rose Revolution administration made no pretense of balance between north and west, instead gunning for rapid Western integration. To appease Moscow, Georgia remained open to Russian capital.
But that wasn’t enough, and Georgian-Russian relations fell to a low point. In 2006, Russia imposed an economic embargo on Georgia and intensified support for the separatist regimes. This was a major blow for Georgia, but the country did not change course.
Relations remain on edge. The Russian Duma is now advising recognition of an independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia gets a Membership Action Plan at the NATO summit in Bucharest. This is blackmail and a ruse: even if Georgia forgoes NATO membership, Russia will carry on with its creeping annexation of the separatist regions.
Tbilisi has strived for normal interstate relations with the northern neighbor, but Russia persists in viewing Georgia as its vassal state. While partial restoration of transport links may suggest a thaw in relations, Russia’s current stance displays little toleration for an independent and sovereign Georgia.
Moscow’s reactions to the recognition of an independent Kosovo show that Russia does not want to normalize relations with Georgia.
Looking through the post-Soviet period, it can be seen that Georgian-Russian relations developed in a dramatic fashion. This was due to Russia’s acute reaction to Georgia’s wish for independence.
During Mikheil Gorbachev’s perestroika, Georgian officials wanted to initiate negotiations on restoring the nation’s independence: Georgia’s task was to get Russia to acknowledge the occupation and annexation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia of 1918–1921. This would lead to renewed independence.
Moscow didn’t take up the suggestion.
On March 31 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s first president, held a referendum to support the declaration of Georgia’s independence on April 9. This was followed by punitive measures from Russia, including support for separatists and the eventual collapse of Gamsakhurdia’s government.
With the dust still swirling, Gamsakhurdia’s successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was forced to make serious concessions. He brought Georgia into the CIS and signed an agreement which would, in essence, keep Georgia under Russian influence in exchange for Moscow’s cooperation in returning breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia to state control. Russia did not hold up its end of the bargain.
Georgia has no further reason to believe that Moscow will help in conflict resolution.
As Georgia enjoyed increase interest from the West over regional energy projects, Shevardnadze attempted to balance relations between Moscow and the West.
But if Shevardnadze was once cautious about looking to the West for security and aid, by the end of his tenure as president he was asking NATO to take in Georgia as a member.
The post-Rose Revolution administration made no pretense of balance between north and west, instead gunning for rapid Western integration. To appease Moscow, Georgia remained open to Russian capital.
But that wasn’t enough, and Georgian-Russian relations fell to a low point. In 2006, Russia imposed an economic embargo on Georgia and intensified support for the separatist regimes. This was a major blow for Georgia, but the country did not change course.
Relations remain on edge. The Russian Duma is now advising recognition of an independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia gets a Membership Action Plan at the NATO summit in Bucharest. This is blackmail and a ruse: even if Georgia forgoes NATO membership, Russia will carry on with its creeping annexation of the separatist regions.