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Feeding the crocodile

By David J. Smith
Tuesday, June 24
It has been ten weeks since then-Russian president Vladimir Putin decreed the quasi-annexation of the Georgian territory of Abkhazia. After ten weeks, the steady torrent of tough Western words without consequence is looking like appeasement. Western leaders wring their hands—what to do? There is plenty to do—if they admit that this is not a transitory dispute among countries that will resolve the matter in accordance with international norms while conducting other business as usual. It is a fundamental dispute with a country that wants to remake international norms. Consequently, other business cannot be as usual.

Following Putin’s decree, Russia rolled 700 heavily armed paratroopers pretending to be peacekeepers into Abkhazia. Then came Russian railroad troops. Western reaction was tough, united, sustained—and ineffective. Western diplomats dithered hither and thither; Moscow smirked and moved on.

Meanwhile, Western leaders deluded themselves to believe that Moscow’s grab for Abkhazia could be isolated from other business.

Paris cooed over now Prime Minister Putin. French Prime Minister Francois Fillon called him "president" twice during a joint press conference. Former French President Jacques Chirac expressed his "very deep friendship," born, he said, “from the remarkable manner in which [he] governed affairs in Russia."

Berlin wooed Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Germany and Russia are "partners in a complicated world,” a beaming German Chancellor Angela Merkel told Medvedev. "Germany,” said Medvedev, “is a strategic partner that we work with on a very high level of economic partnership and political contact.”

Washington sought Congressional assent to a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia. “The United States and Russia at last have a basic framework to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to advance nuclear energy worldwide while enhancing our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation,” Under Secretary of State John Rood told a Congressional committee. “This agreement will add to the strength and stability of the US-Russia relationship as we confront important global challenges of the 21st century.”

Such incongruity results because Western leaders isolate their disagreements with Russia on matters such as Abkhazia, guarding their tempers to safeguard the conduct of what they regard as unconnected business. In contrast, Russian leaders regard everything as connected to everything else and they unabashedly thrust their grievances in the face of their Western counterparts, no matter the occasion.

“We should show our hands, treat each other honestly, respect each other, and then a lot more can be done,” Putin told Le Monde during his recent visit to Paris. In that spirit, he said of NATO, “How can you be a good willing democrat inside the country, and a scary monster outside? What is democracy?”

More politely, Medvedev’s June 5 speech in Berlin addressed issues such as human rights and (selected) European security issues. Still, the message was there: “It is highly symptomatic that current differences with Russia are interpreted by many in the West as a need to simply bring Russia’s policies closer into line with those of the West. But we do not want to be ‘embraced’ in this way.”

“What is permitted to Caesar is not permitted to anyone else?” asked Putin rhetorically in his interview with Le Monde.

Whether in Putin’s Chekist style or Medvedev’s boardroom language, Russia is signaling that, more than disagreeing with the West on particular issues, it does not accept the current international order.

Drawing a general lesson from his analysis of the Napoleonic era, Henry Kissinger writes, “Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiation, is possible only in ‘legitimate’ international orders. Whenever there exists a power which considers the international order or the manner of legitimizing it oppressive…diplomacy, the art of restraining the exercise of power, cannot function.”

Artillery may now be borne by rail, not horses, and the manner of international discourse is altogether different in the Internet era than it was in Napoleon’s day. Nonetheless—now, as then—status quo leaders find it difficult to heed Kissinger’s observation. They treat Russia, again borrowing Kissinger’s words, “as if its protestations were merely tactical; as if it really accepted the existing legitimacy but overstated its case for bargaining purposes.” “Those who warn against the danger in time are considered alarmists,” Kissinger observes.

Russia’s grab for Abkhazia and the West’s inability to give effect to its objections spring from this mismatch of world views. If the West grasps this point, there is plenty it can do! Receive—do not celebrate—Putin and Medvedev, and let everyone know that Russia’s aggression is on the agenda. Shelve the US-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement—(Congress may do that anyway).

These are just a few steps the Western countries can take, however, there are plenty more—hundreds of everyday dealings with Russia that can be affected. Too tough? Winston Churchill once said, “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping that it will eat him last.”

David J. Smith is Director, Georgian Security Analysis Center, Tbilisi, and Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington

This article was first published in the Tbilisi newspaper 24 Saati on June 23.