Kosovo And Georgia's Not So Frozen Conflicts:Questions Russians Need To Ask themselves

Gregory Levonian 2008-09-05

These are heady days for Russians. Finally, after almost two decades of irrelevance, Russia has demonstrated itself to be what it always was, a true world power. In the space of a few weeks, Russia has averted a genocide, frightened and humiliated a supposedly insolent rogue state, and best of all revenged itself for the humiliation of being forced to stand powerlessly by while their historic Orthodox Slavic kin, the Serbs, were bombed into submission over Kosovo.

Not bad for a couple of weeks of work. Finally, Russia put itself back on the map! Russians everywhere are beside themselves in smug satisfaction.

There's only one small problem in all this: none of it bears examination. In all the euphoria Russians are deceiving themselves, and sooner or later they will have to face a very unpleasant fact: that despite its victory on the battlefield, Russia lost this war. Russia has emerged much weaker, and Georgia, at least if it plays its cards right in the coming weeks, has emerged much stronger.

First, some history and context: no matter how often Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton, Condoleezza Rice, George Bush and indeed two entire US administrations care to repeat it, the fact remains that there was no genocide in Kosovo, no ethnic cleansing and indeed nothing at all that justified turning the military might of NATO loose on Yugoslavia. Eight years later, when Kosovo's independence was recognized by the US and its allies, the very peace treaty that Yugoslavia and NATO concluded the war with was further violated. Both the war and the further violation of the peace treaty contravened international law. The Russians said this over and over again, and they were right in their outrage. Another thing they kept saying was that Kosovo was not a unique case, and they were right about that too. There are analogous cases within every dimension in which you may want to consider the Kosovo conflict. Indeed, despite what Secretary of State Rice and President Bush might tell you, the conflicts in Georgia have frightening parallels with Kosovo.

For Russians to hear the nonsense of Kosovo's uniqueness again and again must be irritating and insulting no end. Let's give them credit: they were patient. Russia tried every possible diplomatic channel, Russia did everything possible to avert a precedent, but when all their arguments were ignored and marginalized, Russia decided to reach for the consolation prize and used the Kosovo precedent to justify its own military action. On August 6th, with Georgia providing the perfect excuse by entering South Ossetia, Russia struck back.

On the home front, The Georgians were easily portrayed as aggressors. The Georgians were, after all, wearing American uniforms, had been American trained, had American weapons and Georgia wanted to join NATO in a region that Russia considers not just its backyard, but its back and front porch. It mattered not that Georgia had only invaded its own internationally recognized territory, that the Russian accusations of genocide were baseless, that the civilian casualty figures were grossly inflated, that the Russian-backed Ossetian terrorists had been shelling Georgian civilians for months. The Americans had been just as flexible with the truth in Kosovo and indeed the Russians took satisfaction in their own lies: the whole point was to give the West a taste of its own medicine.

With the US bogged down in Iraq and with Europe dependent on Russian energy, besides wringing their hands there was little that Georgia's allies could do. Georgian forces were routed and let's face it, this was humiliating for everyone concerned. What does it mean to be a US ally, if the US does nothing while you are forced to accept humiliating ceasefire terms – and then forced to accept that those very terms are to be systematically violated. Russia destroyed Georgia while the world looked on, and the world did nothing more than ask Russia to stop again and again.

The West got its just desserts and Russia proved itself a world power... at least so goes the standard rhetoric. Let's look a bit more carefully however. Is this really what happened?

The thing is, with all the military and political successes that followed, Russia got a little carried away and, as often happens with countries at war, started to believe its own propaganda. It went one step too far: Russia over extended itself with the official recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and thus blew the endgame. Recognition was a huge mistake and this is why.

Firstly, the Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a disaster for Serbia and what was left of their claim to Kosovo. Whatever moral high ground the Russians had over the Americans on this issue was ceded when the Russians recognized the parallel Georgian cases. Remember, it was the Russians themselves who were articulating all along that the situations were analogous and that recognition was illegal.

Secondly, having so grotesquely abandoned Serbia with recognition, in the larger arena, they have demonstrated yet again exactly what the benefits are of being Russia's ally: none. Georgia's humiliation was supposed to be all about teaching its near neighbour a lesson – that it doesn't pay to oppose Russia – but the lesson that was actually taught was the exact opposite: it doesn't pay to be Russia's friend.

Thirdly, if Kosovo and the Georgian territories were as analogous as Russia claimed, Russia should have expected more or less the same kind of international support that Kosovo got, right? Actually, perhaps there should have been even more support for the Georgian case since Kosovo has set, as the Russians themselves have said, a precedent. But this has turned out not to be the case. South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence will never, at least for the foreseeable future anyway, enjoy the level of support that Kosovo did. To date a full 46 countries recognize Kosovo, and even on the day of Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, most Western countries were willing to go along with the US. As of this writing only Nicaragua and Hamas have recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Not even Belarus or Kazakhstan – countries that normally go along with everything Russia says – have agreed to recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia. And why would they? All it would accomplish would be to risk alienating themselves from the whole world. Russia is so politically weakened by its mistake that it is in no position to pressure anyone. The US can be wrong about Kosovo and still count on international support, Russia, even when it’s right, has no support.

Which brings us to the final point: how did all of this come about? How is it that Russia stands alone in the world, with no allies but Hamas and far away Nicaragua? Why is it that the countries liberated and reconstructed after World War II by the US are stalwart US allies and those under Moscow's wing are Moscow's strongest critics? Why is it that even a country like the Ukraine, with so many historic and cultural ties with Russia, talks to Russia in the language of confrontation? Why are Poland and the Czech Republic so eager to endure Russia's wrath over the Missile Defence Shield? Even Kosovars and Serbs, if they agree on anything, agree that their long-term future lies in integration with European and trans-Atlantic institutions. Why is this?

Here is the answer: Russia may be powerful, Russia may be awash in petrorubles, but Russia is simply not a reliable partner. The US, as any empire is, might be guilty of running roughshod here and there with smaller nations, but the fact remains it is a force for positive change in the world. Russia in contrast views its neighbors as vassal states or threats. There is no third option. Russia's imperial mindset is simply not comparable to that of the US.

As Russia regained its strength it could maintain the fiction that it was a normal country, that it in fact had allies, that the world was multi-polar. But now, thanks to its missteps in Georgia, Russia has laid its weaker international position open for everyone to see. Recognition requires the one thing that Russia does not have: friends.

The Emperor has himself told the world he is naked.

It's going to take more than money to make Russia into a normal country. As Georgia gets literally billions from real allies to rebuild, free of the albatross that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had become, the Georgian economy will take off. While this happens, as what really transpired becomes clearer with time, Russians will find themselves increasingly in an identity crisis. Having bitten down on Georgia too hastily and too deep, they will find that they have broken their teeth on the last bite.

Gregory Levonian has lived on and off in Georgia for three years and worked in Gori and Tbilisi for a CIDA funded NGO. He speaks fluent Russian and considers himself an avid Russophile. His maintains a blog, GL.Mimino.Org, where the Caucasus region is a frequent topic. He can be reached at GL@Mimino.Org.