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One Year Since the October 26 Parliamentary Elections

By Malkhaz Matsaberidze
Thursday, October 30, 2025
The year following the 2024 parliamentary elections can be assessed as one of the most difficult periods in Georgia's recent political history. It has been characterized by intense political confrontation, the erosion of democratic institutions, and a serious setback to the country's European integration. Against this backdrop, heightened political polarization and public protest remain the nation's primary challenges.

According to the final results from the Central Election Commission (CEC), "Georgian Dream" received 53.93% of the vote, securing a majority with 89 parliamentary seats. The main opposition parties - those that surpassed the 5% threshold - deemed the results illegitimate and refused to take up their mandates. This became the primary driver of the political crisis. International observers and local NGOs noted that the election was marred by numerous significant violations, which, in their assessment, may have compromised the free expression of the voters' will. The opposition's boycott, coupled with a policy of increasing distance from the West, has challenged the "Dream" government's international legitimacy.

The majority of the opposition continues to reject the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections, alleging they were the product of large-scale fraud. These claims are based on violation reports from observer organizations, discrepancies in voter turnout data, and doubts cast on the electronic vote-counting process. Consequently, a significant portion of the opposition views the parliament elected in 2024 as lacking popular legitimacy.

Due to the opposition boycott, the new parliament has operated under the absolute dominance of the ruling "Georgian Dream" party, resulting in a stark lack of political pluralism. The ruling party carved out the "People's Power" and "European Socialists" factions from its own ranks, tasking them with playing the role of an opposition within the effectively single-party legislature.

The most significant event of the past year was the ruling party's reintroduction and adoption of the "On Transparency of Foreign Influence" law, defying massive public protests and international criticism. Critics argue the law is aimed at silencing civil society organizations and independent media, prompting widespread accusations of deepening authoritarianism and democratic backsliding in Georgia. The adoption of other controversial laws has further intensified the confrontation between the government and an active segment of the public.

However, the primary outcome of the past year has been the derailment of Georgia's European integration. The European Union and Western partners strongly criticized the new laws and the political climate, stating they were incompatible with the obligations of an EU candidate country. In a defiant move, "Georgian Dream" announced it was freezing membership negotiations with the EU until 2028. In response, the EU effectively suspended Georgia's integration process and began reviewing potential sanctions. The nation's foreign policy course has now been, almost openly, redirected.

The protest sees the past year as a radical reversal of Georgia's foreign policy. They accuse the ruling party of implementing "Russian-style" legislation (like the "foreign influence" law) and of deliberately sabotaging European integration. They argue this policy has caused a severe deterioration in relations with Georgia's key Western partners (the US and EU), bringing the country to the brink of international isolation.

Of the four boycotting opposition parties, two (Gakharia's party and "Lelo") participated in the October 4 local elections, hoping to win control of major cities from "Dream"; however, their results were modest. These elections coincided with a rally initiated by Paata Burchuladze, Levan Khabeishvili, Murtaz Zodelava, and other UNM-affiliated figures, including Georgia's Third President Mikheil Saakashvili, who had assured the public that the "Dream" government could be changed peacefully in a single day, October 4th. Burchuladze and others were arrested that same day, apparently having been "misled". This event triggered a series of arrests, charging others with participation in the rally.

Against this backdrop, Giorgi Gakharia's party announced its decision to end its boycott and enter parliament. They justified the move by stating the boycott had been a mistake and that they are now attempting to re-engage in the political process from within the legislature.

It is difficult to say what Gakharia's 12 deputies will accomplish in parliament, or what the entire opposition might have achieved had it entered a year ago. It is noted that entering parliament, unlike a boycott, would have given the opposition access to legitimate constitutional levers. However, using these levers would likely have only amounted to protesting "Dream's" policies and perhaps delaying some legislation. "Georgian Dream" held a large enough majority to pass any legislation it wished, regardless of opposition presence.

The main argument for the boycott was that entering parliament would have legitimized an illegitimate regime. The main counter-argument was that it meant surrendering all political and oversight mechanisms to the ruling party. In the given context, where "Georgian Dream" holds a clear majority (89 of 150 seats), the opposition would have been powerless to block legislation by votes alone.

Looking ahead to late 2025 and early 2026, the domestic political climate remains highly volatile and uncertain. While tensions stemming from the 2024 elections persist, both domestically and internationally, the political landscape is far from static. The protest movement remains an active and prominent force. This was clearly demonstrated on October 26, 2025, the first anniversary of the contested election, when several opposition parties - noting their own internal democratic party systems - collaborated with civil society organizations to stage a large-scale protest. The significant public turnout underscored that popular resistance is ongoing. Amidst this sustained confrontation, the opposition continues to maintain that the only viable path out of the crisis is to hold new, free, and fair elections conducted in full compliance with democratic standards.

International organizations (such as the EBRD, ADB, and World Bank) are making quite high economic growth forecasts for Georgia in 2025-2026. However, given the risks of political instability, the country's economic development and attraction of investments will be a subject of constant discussion.