Why Georgian Dream Is Using the Term "Russophobia" During the August War Anniversary

By Malkhaz Matsaberidze

Thursday, August 13, 2025

As the anniversary of the August 2008 war recently passed, Georgian Dream intensified a campaign regarding "Russophobia" in Georgia in the style of Russian propaganda, referring to individuals critical of the ruling party-who protest both Russia's occupation of Georgia and Russia's invasion of Ukraine-as "Russophobes." A statement concerning "Russophobia" was issued on August 4 by Irakli Kobakhidze, Georgian Dream Chairman and Prime Minister.

Talk of "Russophobia" in Georgia, particularly in recent years, has become one of the central and most acute topics of political discourse. The active return of this term to the Georgian political space is driven by several interrelated factors:

First and foremost is the war in Ukraine and geopolitical polarization: following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (since 2022), Georgia's domestic political confrontation deepened even further. The ruling party and its leaders characterize the strong anti-Russian sentiments and criticism from the opposition, parts of the media, and the civil sector as "Russophobia" and deliberate provocation. According to statements by the Prime Minister and the ruling team, these groups are attempting to run an ethnically motivated campaign against Russians in the country and drag Georgia into war.

Meanwhile, the opposition and civil sector maintain that the Russophobia narrative is artificial, used by the ruling power to suppress criticism, discredit Western interests, and manipulate public emotions. They contend that the existing fear and protest toward Russia's policies and aggression stem not from ethnic hatred, but from a natural impulse to protect national security.

Kremlin narratives and new initiatives are also notable here. Russian propaganda has long made active use of the term "Russophobia" across the post-Soviet space. In Georgia, organizations like the "Russophobia Monitoring Council" have recently formed with the stated goal of recording "anti-Russian rhetoric and discrimination" in public discourse. The emergence of such platforms further elevates the issue on the political agenda.

Consequently, talk of "Russophobia" in Georgia is not merely a subject of academic or sociological debate-it is a primary political weapon in domestic polarisation. One side sees within it the opposition's destructive and radical nature, while the other views it as a continuation of Kremlin propaganda lines and an attempt to stifle democratic criticism.

Kobakhidze's statement and lengthy open letter coincided directly with another anniversary of the August war, sparking heightened controversy and criticism among the public. According to analysts and opposition figures, raising such topics during these days and shifting the focus away from Russian aggression toward domestic "Russophobia" and opposition fault is a calculated strategy. They argue this represents a continuation of the ruling team's established political line, through which they seek to leverage the August war anniversary to score domestic political points and discredit their opponents.

By propagating the term, Georgian Dream is attempting to reiterate its political stance: that its top priority remains a "pragmatic and peaceful policy," whereas the sharp anti-Russian reactions displayed by the opposition are artificial, destructive, and dangerous for the country.

According to critics, when high-ranking Georgian officials adopt terms in official discourse that are directly propagated by Russian propaganda itself-such as accusing internal political opponents of "Russophobia"-it creates specific risks:

There is a danger that Russia could use these statements to "justify" itself and gain additional political or information-warfare leverage against Georgia. Russian high officials and diplomats-such as representatives from Russia's informational and political bodies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-regularly issue statements regarding a growing "anti-Russian campaign," "Russophobia," and hostile sentiments in Georgia.

Russia's official political discourse frequently attempts to portray critical attitudes toward the Russian government's policies and occupation not as a natural response, but as "artificially imposed Russophobia," sometimes alleging it is fueled by Western powers.

Critics contend that when a country with 20% of its territory under occupation utilizes the term "Russophobia" for internal political struggles, it devalues national interests and emboldens the aggressor's narrative.

The ruling Georgian Dream party rejects these allegations, maintaining that its policy is "pragmatic and peaceful," and that its internal criticism is aimed not at weakening the state, but at thwarting attempts by radical groups to drag the country into war.

According to experts, when government representatives focus on the anniversary of the August war by blaming the previous administration and "internal agents" rather than highlighting Russian aggression, it completely reverses the roles of aggressor and victim. In their view, this approach blurs the reality of who the actual occupier is.

Analysts note that using terms like Russophobia and accusing opponents of "acting on foreign orders" directly mirrors the Kremlin's official propaganda line. Experts believe this allows the government to frame internal political opponents and critical media as enemies of the country.

Some analysts maintain that such statements and narratives threaten the country's Western prospects. They argue that this represents an effort by the ruling team to prepare public opinion to view criticism from Western partners as "agent-driven interference," ultimately contributing to Georgia's international isolation.