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Why Has Russia Imposed New Trade Restrictions on Georgia?

By Malkhaz Matsaberidze
Tuesday, November 17, 2026
Last month, Russia's Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) temporarily restricted seven Georgian companies from importing and selling alcoholic and non-alcoholic products on the Russian market. Experts and economists often view such measures as one of Russia's instruments of political pressure on Georgia, whereby economic measures and food safety concerns are used as tools of political influence. Various theories have emerged about what Moscow is demanding from the Ivanishvili government.

Russia frequently uses trade restrictions as leverage, particularly when dealing with a market as large and important to Georgian exports as its own. Such measures serve to demonstrate Moscow's power and remind the Georgian authorities how vulnerable the country's economy is due to its dependence on the Russian market. They act as a warning that serious economic damage could be inflicted on Georgia at any time if its political course shifts in a direction Moscow finds undesirable.

By targeting individual companies, Russia seeks to demonstrate that it alone determines the conditions under which businesses can enter and remain in its market. This creates uncertainty and fear among business circles, encouraging producers to exercise caution, avoid statements that might displease the Kremlin, and press their own government to maintain or improve relations with Russia.

Russia's trade policy towards Georgia has historically followed a cyclical pattern: periods of improved relations and the reopening of trade are periodically followed by restrictions and embargoes, as seen in 2006 and subsequent years.

Since 2012, the ruling party has pursued what it calls a "pragmatic policy" towards Russia, aimed at restoring and maintaining economic and trade relations, including reopening access to the Russian market, while continuing to declare its commitment to European integration. In recent years, however, particularly amid changing geopolitical circumstances, the opposition and civil society have argued that Georgian Dream is in fact pursuing a pro-Russian course and steering the country away from the Western orbit. The ruling party rejects these accusations, maintaining that its main priority is to preserve peace in the country and avoid war.

This contrast has given even targeted restrictions imposed by Russia a different political significance in the eyes of the Georgian public. Statements by Georgian Dream representatives regarding Russia's restrictions on imports of certain Georgian products were largely cautious, emphasising the need to examine the situation further. For example, Georgian Dream-led Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili described the situation as "unclear" and said that more information was needed. The ruling party sought to avoid giving the issue excessive political weight, presenting it instead as a technical or market-related matter. Nevertheless, the restrictions prompted considerable criticism and raised questions among the public and experts.

According to opposition representatives and economists, the government's restrained response is itself a continuation of its broader policy of maintaining trade and economic relations with Russia while avoiding open political criticism of similar actions by the Kremlin.

In the opposition's view, the incident once again demonstrates that Russia is not a reliable trading partner and that it consistently uses economic leverage as an instrument of political pressure and coercion. They argue that the Kremlin is seeking to exploit what they describe as the Georgian government's excessive compliance, or to demonstrate its influence over Tbilisi on various political issues.

The opposition strongly criticised Georgian Dream for what it described as an overly cautious and muted response. It argued that the government had failed to take an adequate and firm position in defence of the country's national interests, thereby weakening Georgia's economic sovereignty. Opposition parties and some economists once again highlighted the risks posed by the Georgian economy's heavy reliance on the Russian market. According to trade statistics, for example, a significant share of Georgia's wine exports goes to Russia. They argued that the government should have made market diversification and the expansion of exports to European and other alternative markets a priority long ago, so that the country would not be left vulnerable to similar politically motivated trade restrictions.

The opposition also linked the restrictions to Russia's demand that Georgia sign a non-use-of-force agreement with the separatist authorities. This context, they argued, helps explain the political developments unfolding at the same time. Russia's Foreign Ministry renewed its calls for "guarantees of non-use of force" in relation to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as for the so-called delimitation of borders. These demands coincided with the restrictions imposed on Georgian companies' access to the Russian market.

According to the opposition and political observers, the two developments are directly linked and form part of a broader strategy of political and economic pressure by Russia on the Georgian government.

While Moscow continues to formally demand that Tbilisi sign a non-use-of-force agreement, a move that, in their view, is intended to legitimise the sovereignty of the de facto regions or consolidate their separation from Georgia, economic measures-including restrictions on wine and mineral water exports-serve as an additional means of pressure.

The opposition argues that the Kremlin is seeking to force the Georgian government to comply with its political demands concerning regional security. The trade restrictions, they say, demonstrate the economic cost Tbilisi could face if it openly refuses to accept Moscow's demands.

Opposition parties also argue that Georgian Dream's conciliatory approach and limited public response encourage Russia to increase the pressure and put forward more far-reaching political demands, as Moscow sees that its economic leverage is producing results.

In turn, the ruling party responded to such statements by saying that similar political demands from Russia were "nothing new" and that its position on Georgia's territorial integrity and non-recognition policy remained unchanged. The opposition, however, argues that the ruling party's actions on the ground and its conciliatory approach to Russian pressure expose the country to serious geopolitical risks.

Russia has imposed restrictions on Armenian products several times in 2026. In May 2026, for example, Russia officially suspended the import and sale of certain Armenian wines and brandies on the Russian market, citing alleged non-compliance with "quality and safety standards". Observers frequently linked these measures to Armenia's political course and its efforts to deepen ties with the West, including closer relations with the European Union and growing tensions with Russia.

Moldova, meanwhile, has faced periodic Russian embargoes and sanitary restrictions for years, particularly since it adopted a clear course towards European integration and opened accession negotiations with the EU. However, in the latest wave of restrictions in autumn 2026, Georgian and Armenian alcohol and beverage producers appear to have been the primary targets.

The developments have once again highlighted Russia's unreliability as a partner, even towards countries that have remained close to Moscow. They illustrate how Russia can use economic pressure against even those countries and political forces that have sought to maintain a loyal or pragmatic relationship with it.

This logic comes with several harsh realities. In Russia's political vocabulary, an "ally" or "partner" is not an equal. Rather, it is expected to be subordinate. The Kremlin does not recognise the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation; instead, it demands unquestioning compliance.

When a country seeks to pursue a pragmatic or even concession-based policy towards Russia and still faces economic retaliation, it exposes a fundamental reality: Russia has no friends, only interests and instruments of control.

Such actions also place even those political forces that justify closer ties with Russia in a difficult position. When Moscow treats its own "friends" no differently from others, it undermines the argument that good relations with Russia can guarantee a country's security and economic stability. Ultimately, such measures serve as another reminder that economic and political ties with Russia are inherently fragile and can be jeopardised at any moment, making it impossible to regard Moscow as a reliable partner.